



183 A.D.3d 410, 121 N.Y.S.3d 594 (Mem), 2020 N.Y.  
Slip Op. 02719

**\*\*1** Edward Williams, Appellant,  
v  
New York Property Insurance  
Underwriting Association, Respondent, et  
al., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First  
Department, New York  
11481, 151083/14  
May 7, 2020

CITE TITLE AS: Williams v New York  
Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn.

#### HEADNOTE

#### [Insurance Cancellation](#)

Notice of Cancellation Made after Two Failed Attempts  
to Inspect Insured Premises—Failure to Overcome  
Presumption of Proper Mailing

Law Office of Craig A. Blumberg, New York (Craig A.  
Blumberg of counsel), for appellant.  
Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass LLP, New York  
(Constantino P. Suriano of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert R.

Reed, J.), entered May 23, 2019, which granted the  
motion of defendant New York Property Insurance  
Underwriting Association (NYPIUA) for summary  
judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously  
affirmed, without costs.

NYPIUA, created by statute, is required to adhere to its  
plan of operation ([Insurance Law § 5402 \[d\]](#)). The plan of  
operation specifically states that, “[a]ny person who, after  
reasonable notice, has not provided access to the insured  
property for inspection,” is not eligible for coverage.

NYPIUA’s submissions on summary judgment, which  
included, inter alia, the plan of operation, the deposition  
testimony of NYPIUA’s underwriting supervisor, her  
affidavit, and the affidavit of an investigator assigned to  
inspect plaintiff’s premises, were sufficient to justify  
finding in its favor, as a matter of law. The evidence  
showed that notice of cancellation was made after two  
failed attempts to inspect the insured premises.

Plaintiff’s bare denial of receipt of the cancellation notice,  
**\*411** standing alone, did not overcome the presumption of  
proper mailing (*Matter of Hernandez v New York City  
Hous. Auth.*, 129 AD3d 446, 446 [1st Dept 2015]),  
particularly in light of an email forwarded to NYPIUA  
soon after the notice of cancellation was sent, which  
indicated that the cancellation notice had been received by  
the plaintiff’s producer.

Thus, we find that Supreme Court correctly determined  
that NYPIUA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law  
(see *Tapscott Food Corp. v Lincoln Ins. Co.*, 161 AD2d  
451 [1st Dept 1990]). Concur—Acosta, P.J., Renwick,  
Richter, González, JJ.

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